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Thomas Hobbes, war and ‘the 
natural condition of man’: 
plus ça change …   
Peter E.R. Jones 
 It is customary in any commentary on Thomas Hobbes 
(1588–1679) and his best-known work, Leviathan, to 
emphasise the influence on him of the pre-eminent thinkers 
of his time, men with whom he had personal dealings (such 
as Bacon, Descartes and Galileo), forerunners of the Age of 
Enlightenment. It is also well recognised that Hobbes was 
much influenced by the civil disorders in England during his 
own time. However, the influence on him of the great writers 
and thinkers of ancient Greece has been less well recognised. 
Peter Jones was a lecturer in the former School of Political Science and Public Administration at 
Victoria University of Wellington in the early 1970s, before taking up a position at the University of 
Queensland. He wrote this previously unpublished piece on Thomas Hobbes in August 2003, after 
the invasion of Iraq. Since then, events in that part of the world have been reminiscent of Hobbes’ 
‘war of all against all’. Peter Jones died in February 2016, aged 88. His colleague and friend Bob 
Gregory, of VUW’s School of Government, has lightly edited the piece for publication in Policy 
Quarterly.
By 1628 Hobbes’ opinions about the 
nature of humankind, war(re), fraud 
and corruption, and the need for unity 
maintained by a strong ruler were well 
established. Those views derived from his 
classical studies and were undoubtedly 
reinforced by his observations of the 
emerging conflict in England. His later 
exposure to Euclidean geometry and 
to the Galilean laws of motion inspired 
him to elaborate, systematise, justify 
and legitimate those preconceptions, as 
subsequently articulated in Leviathan.1 
There is found his often-quoted 
description of the natural, egoistic, asocial 
person, driven by fear and self-interest: 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent 
to a time of Warre, where every man 
is enemy to every man; the same 
is consequent to the time, wherein 
men live without other security, than 
their own strength, and their own 
invention shall furnish them withal. 
In such condition, there is no place 
for industry; because the fruit thereof 
is uncertain; and consequently no 
culture of the earth, no navigation, 
nor the use of commodities that may 
be imported by Sea; no commodious 
Building; no instruments of moving 
and removing such things as require 
much force; no knowledge of the 
face of the earth; no account of time; 
Hobbes was first and foremost a classical 
scholar. After finishing his university 
studies, his first employment was with 
the Earl of Devonshire, whose excellent 
library was at his disposal. He made 
full use of this for 20 years, eventually 
publishing his first major work in 1628: a 
translation of Thucydides’ The History of 
the Peloponnesian War. This was at a time 
when the king and Parliament in England 
were already at loggerheads. It was clearly 
intended as a cautionary tale, which 
Hobbes himself admitted later in his life, 
saying that he ‘wished to point out the 
unsuitability and danger of democracy’. 
He seems to have adopted this point of 
view from Thucydides in light of the 
latter’s account of the decline of Athens.
In the beginning was the Warre, and the Warre was  
with man, and the Warre was man.
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no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and 
which is worst of all, continuall fear 
and danger of violent death; and the 
life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish and short.
This colourful and arresting passage 
has captured the imagination of 
generations of readers. But how original 
is the image it presents? The answer 
would seem to be: not at all.
War was endemic to the world of the 
ancient Greeks. Brought up on Homer, 
their history began with the legendary 
Trojan War, and thereafter city-states – 
from their beginnings until the eventual 
loss of their political independence – 
were almost continually at war with one 
another. The primacy and permanence 
of war are constant themes in Greek 
literature. Thus, in The Iliad, says 
Odysseus: ‘We Achaeans are the men 
whom Zeus decrees, from youth to old 
age, must wind down our brutal wars 
to the bitter end until we drop and die, 
down to the last man.’ And in The Laws, 
through the Cretan Cleinias, Plato averred 
that, ‘Peace is just a name [and] The 
truth is that every city-state is by natural 
law engaged in a perpetual undeclared 
war with every other city-state [emphasis 
added].’
One of these city-states, Athens, 
despite a protracted lull in the fighting 
from 446 to 431BC, was for all practical 
considerations continually at war from 
480 to 404BC, including its conflict with 
another city-state, Sparta, from 431 to 
404BC – described by Thucydides as ‘the 
never-ending war’. This history resonates 
in Hobbes’ definition of war: 
For Warre, consisteth not in Battell 
only, or in the act of fighting: but 
in a tract of time, wherein the Will 
to contend by Battell is sufficiently 
known: and therefore the notion 
of Time, is to be considered in the 
nature of Warre, … So the nature 
of Warre, consisteth not in the 
actual fighting; but in the known 
disposition thereto, during all the 
time there is no assurance to the 
contrary.
Thucydides also rejected all 
consideration of the gods or fate in 
human affairs, and attributed blame for 
the causes of war and its miseries entirely 
to humankind’s nature and behaviour, a 
view obviously accepted also by Hobbes.  
Hobbes, in depicting the dreadful 
condition of people living in a permanent 
state of war, ‘everyman against everyman’, 
in the state of nature, contrasts the 
horror of that situation with its absence: 
the many positive developments that 
could be expected to accrue to people 
living in secure, peaceful co-existence. 
This is not a new device, as once more 
there is a classical precedent. Homer, in 
The Iliad, evokes images of peaceful life 
in order to emphasise the futility of war. 
This dichotomy between peace and war, 
between creation and destruction, is 
epitomised in the scenes emblazoned on 
the shield of Achilles. Hobbes might well 
have drawn his own inspiration from that 
source.2
As for Achilles himself, a man who lived 
and died by war, deliberately choosing 
glory and an early death, he seems almost 
to be an exemplar of Hobbes’ egoistic, 
natural man.3 Achilles is described in 
The Iliad through the voice of Apollo as 
being ‘like some lion going his barbaric 
way, giving in to his own power, his brute 
force and wild pride’. His life may not 
have been solitary, notwithstanding the 
time he spent sulking in his tent, but it 
was certainly ‘poore, nasty, brutish and 
short’.  
More generally, if less poetically, a 
similar picture of natural, asocial man 
appears in another text which would have 
been well familiar to Hobbes. Aristotle, 
in Politics, states that, ‘The man who is 
incapable of working in common, or 
who in his self-sufficiency has no need 
of others, is no part of the community, 
[and is] like a beast or a god.’ Aristotle 
was right to refer to gods and beasts. The 
Greek gods, being immortal, had no fear 
of ‘death’ and were able to give a free rein 
to their pursuit of self-interest. They were 
indeed supreme egoists, who recognised 
no authority apart from themselves – 
except superior force: that is, the will of 
Zeus. ‘Obey my orders’, says Zeus in The 
Iliad. He does not explain his will, but 
threatens and enforces. He seems more 
nearly the prototype of Hobbes’ sovereign 
than do Plato’s absolutist philosopher 
king(s) or statesmen/lawmakers. Indeed, 
at one point Hobbes calls the sovereign 
‘a mortal god’.
How can people rise above their natural 
condition then? Hobbes tells us that this 
may occur only when people generally 
are aware of the dreadfulness of their 
situation, realise that their self-interest 
would be better served by peace than war, 
and begin to apply their reason to that 
end. As a basis for the development of 
his subsequent argument, Hobbes affirms 
Socrates’ dictum that the unexamined life 
is not worth living, a point of view never 
more compelling than in the instance 
given. However, uniquely he concludes 
that the only way of securing lasting peace 
is if all people submit themselves to the 
will of an overlord, a sovereign who can 
demonstrably impose and enforce order 
as and how that sovereign sees fit.4 
Certainly, Hobbes shared Plato’s 
hatred of anarchy, and desired law and 
order in society, as well as a reliance 
upon reason (enlightened self-interest) to 
control people. But he differed markedly 
from Plato in that he was concerned 
with practical considerations, mainly 
the checking of egoistic subjects, and the 
preservation of a state of peace based on 
a regime of fear upheld by superior force, 
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rather than the inculcation of moral 
values or the establishment of right laws.
Nevertheless, Hobbes foresaw 
that difficulties would derive from 
any extended peace, and its attendant 
advances, especially overpopulation and 
poverty:  
The multitude of poor, and yet 
strong people still increasing, 
they are to be transplanted into 
Countries not sufficiently inhabited: 
where neverthelesse, they are not to 
exterminate those they find there; 
but constrain them to inhabit closer 
together, and not range a great deal 
of ground, to snatch what they find; 
but to court each little Plot with 
Art and labour, to give them their 
sustenance in due season. And when 
all the world is overcharged with 
Inhabitants, then the last remedy 
of all is Warre; which provideth for 
every man, by Victory, or Death.
As with the concluding lines of his 
depiction of the life of people in a state 
of nature, Hobbes here imbues his final 
sentence with a dramatic aspect which 
catches the reader’s attention. Yet whereas 
in the first case there is a steady build-
up of literary tension, a foreshadowing 
of worse to come, in the above instance 
this is absent. Instead, after a somewhat 
prosaic discussion, the denouement is 
almost casually sprung upon the reader, 
without any intimations of horror or 
despair. This time Hobbes is displaying 
a different attitude towards Warre, 
seemingly implying a therapeutic war, an 
essential bleeding of the body politic. But 
then what?
No enlargement on this pronounce-
ment was offered, and Hobbes instead 
proceeded to other matters. It constituted 
a total anticlimax. Perhaps he thought 
it too remote a prospect to warrant 
elaboration. On the other hand, what 
was there to say? Did he hope for a full 
recovery, a return to business as usual, 
for the survivors? Or did he envisage a 
relapse into the state of nature?5 He clearly 
did not have a rosy view of the world. 
Like his preceptor, Thucydides, he was 
a pessimist. His analysis of natural man 
as an egoistic creature, fearful, deceitful 
and incorrigible, continually needing to 
be subdued and constrained by nothing 
less than an absolute dictator, shows that 
he expected the worst. Looked at in this 
way, a passage in his writing that has 
largely been disregarded, because it was 
offered only en passant, assumes a greater 
significance.6
Hobbes may have been admitting, 
rather indirectly, that he was not 
confident that in the long run the 
measures he proposed for establishing 
and preserving an orderly society would 
be sufficient. The forces of anarchy might 
be overcome temporarily, but sooner or 
later they would be resurgent. In the final 
analysis then, Hobbes’ psycho-social-
political vision, like the history of ancient 
Greece, begins and ends with war. Even 
though any interwar period of relative 
peace can be regarded as an improvement 
on the state of nature, and on war in 
general, it is worth remembering that 
in Hobbes’ terms it will always be a 
precarious peace, made possible only by 
the imposition of the most oppressive 
measures; an uncertain peace, requiring 
constant vigilance in its maintenance, 
and enforced by all necessary means. In 
the Hobbesian syntax of never-ending 
war, peace is merely punctuation.7 
In 1939, in a world which had not 
fully known peace for a quarter of a 
century, and only four years before her 
death, Simone Weil wrote in her essay 
‘L’Iliade ou le poème de la force’:  
The true hero, the true subject, the 
center of the Iliad, is force. Force 
as man’s instrument, force as man’s 
master, force before which human 
flesh shrinks back. The human soul, 
in this poem, is shown always in its 
relation to force; swept away, blinded 
by the force it thinks it can direct, 
bent under the pressure of the force 
to which it is subjected. Those who 
had dreamed that force, thanks to 
progress, now belonged to the past, 
have seen the poem as a historic 
document; those who can see that 
force, today as in the past, is at the 
center of all human history, find in 
the Iliad its most beautiful, its purest 
mirror.
Certainly Hobbes, so familiar with 
The Iliad, as with much else in Greek 
literature, was one of those who saw 
clearly that force, one way or another, 
is at the centre of all human history. 
He hoped, perhaps only fleetingly, that 
given the will, and backed by the most 
stringent of controls, force could become 
humankind’s instrument for forging a 
better way, that instead of remaining a 
rampant, ubiquitous threat it could be 
successfully channelled for the common 
good of all. Yet he was clearly dubious 
about this prospect, leaving us with the 
suggestion that, in the end, and despite 
our best endeavours, even because of 
them, force would eventually reassert 
its dominion, and that ‘continuall fear 
and danger of violent death’ would once 
more prevail in the world. As it was in 
the beginning, is now and ever shall be, 
Warre without end. Plus ça change, plus 
c’est la même chose. 
1 The idea of motion as a fundamental principle of the 
cosmos would not have been new to Hobbes. Through 
Plato and Aristotle he would have been aware of the ideas 
of Heraclitus, who held that motion and change (flux) were 
perpetual, and that these, together with conflict, provided 
the underlying dynamism of the universe. As a corollary, 
Heraclitus saw war as an inevitable part of human existence 
and believed that mankind was necessarily constrained and 
directed only by force. These views are entirely consistent 
with Hobbes’, as expressed in Leviathan.
2 W.H. Auden’s poem ‘The Shield of Achilles’ is similarly 
inspired by the same source. 
3 Glory was one of Hobbes’ three principal causes of conflict: 
first, competition; secondly, diffidence; and thirdly, glory.
4 In essence, Hobbes offered a social version of a ‘creation 
myth’. ‘The natural condition of man’, the asocial state of 
nature, served as a primal chaos. Human intelligence reacts 
with chaos and eventually there is conceived and brought 
forth an archman: the sovereign. Wielding the absolute 
power inherent in their being, the sovereign imposes order 
on chaos, thereby creating the prerequisite for the emergence 
and development of social life. The sovereign continues 
to oversee the state of order and acts at will to reassert it 
over whatever outbreaks of chaos threaten it. Thus, the 
sovereign’s role, from conception onwards, is god-like.
5 Of course, the state of nature could be regarded as ‘business 
as usual’, one part of a cycle of rise and fall, a Darwinian 
process of natural selection in which the strongest and 
cleverest successively survive until at last they either 
transcend the cycle, or the earth’s resources are depleted 
to the point where the human species can no longer exist, 
except perhaps in small numbers in a perpetual state of 
nature. 
6 At the time Hobbes was writing, the idea of world 
overpopulation would have seemed far-fetched enough to be 
disregarded. Today the pendulum has swung almost to the 
other extreme, so that the concept of world overpopulation 
has become commonplace. Any modern student of 
Leviathan, while appreciating Hobbes’ foresight, would be 
just as likely to disregard the passage.
7 Hobbes foreshadowed the Prussian military theorist Carl 
von Clausewitz (1780–1831), while reversing the latter’s 
proposition. To Hobbes, politics was nothing more than the 
continuation of war by other means. 
